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ABSTRACT
.The purpose of this study is to assess the influence of indi­
vidual differences in information utilization on the interpersonal 
evaluation process, and to examine the effects of stress on the eva­
luator as he forms his judgment.
An experimental task was devised in which two groups of sub­
jects, one high and one low in cognitive complexity, viewed bogus 
videotapes of one person in interaction with another. After view­
ing the tapes, subjects in both groups were exposed to one of three 
stress conditions: neutral or no stress; irrelevant stress, in which 
the stress is induced as part of another experiment; and relevant stress, 
in which the stress arises from the task itself. Each subject then 
recorded his evaluation of the target person.
The results indicated that subjects high in cognitive complexity 
wrote more complex evaluations than subjects low in cognitive com­
plexity; subjects not exposed to stress wrote more complex evaluations 
than subjects operating in a stressful environment.
It is suggested that these differences are a function of the 
individual’s ability to utilize information, based on the number of 
dimensions he has available for this utilization. The results suggest 
that stress, either by reducing the number of dimensions available 
or by weakening the links between dimensions, reduces the individual’s 
ability to process the information.
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INTERPERSONAL EVALUATION 
COGNITIVE ASPECTS AND THE EFFECTS OF STRESS
Research on the processes and principles of interpersonal e- 
valuation, or person perception, has in recent years been conducted 
using two quite disparate approaches, each emphasizing a particular 
mode of study and a particular theoretical context. One body of re­
search, stimulated primarily by the work of Heider(1958) and given 
further impetus by the findings of Jones and his associates(Jones,
Davis and Gergen, 1961; Jones, Jones and Gergen, 1963; Jones and Da­
vis, 1-965) focuses on the perceiver as one whose primary tasks are 
attribution and inference. The former process, as defined by Kelley 
(1967) in his summary of theoretical principles of attribution, is 
one of inferring or perceiving the dispositional properties of enti­
ties in the environment. That is, the perceiver seeks to find suf­
ficient reason why the target person acts in a certain way. Hence, 
according to these researchers, the perceiver infers the stable dis­
positions or attributes of the target person from the latter1s actions.
In addition, the evaluator or perceiver decides whether to 
attribute an action by the individual to that individual’s intentions 
or to chance factors. The target person will be evaluated different­
ly if the effect of an action is perceived as intended by him than 
if the effect is seen as accidental or unintentional. Our judicial 
system provides an illustrative example; a man who kills for revenge 
(i.e., he intended to kill) is judged more harshly than one who kills 
accidentally.
3The attributive models of interpersonal evaluation, then, 
view the perceiver as a decision-maker, one who weighs the informa­
tion received about the target person in accordance with what he has 
inferred about the individual from past contact(i.e., does this trait 
really belong to him?). A second line of research on person percep­
tion is concerned not with whether the perceiver actually ascribes a 
trait to the target person, but the manner in which the ascribed 
traits are joined. Mathematical theories of person perception accept 
the validity of all the traits of the target person presented to the 
perceiver, and are more concerned with determining the rules govern­
ing the combination of these traits to produce an overall impression.
One group of researchers, for example, favors an averaging 
type formulation, in which great attention is paid to the balancing 
of extreme traits by moderate traits(Anderson, 1959, 1965; Levy and 
Richter, 1963; Rimoldi, 1956; Weiss, 1963). Another group of inves­
tigators favors a summation model which holds that each new piece of 
information received about a target person by the perceiver serves 
to increase his attitude toward or evaluation of that person(Abelson, 
1961; Gulliksen, 1956). In recent years, the addition of factor 
analysis as a technique for analyzing trait relationships has led to 
studies of such relationships in terms of constant error(Levy and Du­
gan, 1960), and the widespread use of multidimensional scaling techniques 
(Rosenberg et al, 1968). One of the most recent models developed, 
which analyzes an evaluation as a complex stimulus whose compound is 
the weighted average of its constituents, where the weighting associ-
4ated with each element is directly related to its extremity(Manis 
et al, 1968), reflects a more sophisticated use of mathematics in 
its highly complex approach to the evaluation process.
Ultimately, any theory of interpersonal evaluation must con­
cern itself with the cognitive processes by which bits of information 
about the target person are selected and eventually organized into 
a unified evaluation or opinion. While such processes have not been 
the nexus of interest for either of the two models discussed, both 
have attempted to indicate, at least indirectly, the nature of infor­
mation utilization. Attribution models, for example, suggest what 
may be loosely termed an "input filter”, with the individual accepting 
or rejecting various traits, depending on past information accepted 
as valid. Similarly, mathematical models, operating on the assumption 
that all traits have been accepted as valid by the perceiver, focus on 
combinatory rules.
It is surprising, therefore, that interpersonal evaluation 
theories in which cognitive processes play a substantial role have 
by and large neglected the inclusion of individual differences in the 
operation of such processes as factors relevant to that evaluation. 
Evaluation theories have consistently assumed that the unique cogni­
tive, as well as motivational, characteristics of the perceiver are 
irrelevant to the manner in which he evaluates another individual. 
Perhaps, then, additional light may be shed on the evaluation process 
by examining it within the context of individual differences in the 
utilization of information. In other words, in what ways in informa-
5tion about another person received, selectively processed and weight­
ed by the perceiver in the same manner as any other type of informa­
tion?
In this respect, the research of personality theorists on cog­
nitive styles may prove illuminating. Cognitive styles refer to re­
latively fixed patterns for experiencing the world, mechanisms by which 
information about the environment is selected, organized and combined.
Of these, the cognitive style which has been most concerned with in­
dividual differences in the ability of the individual to differentiate 
the behavior of others has been cognitive complexity-simplicity-.
In their formulation of the cognitive complexity-simplicity 
variable, Schroder and his associates (Schroder, Driver and Streufert, 
1965) view it as a construct dealing with the nature and interdepen­
dence of rules avilable for organizing dimensional values. Like 
Bruner(1957, 1961), Schroder employs the concept of "categories" 
or "dimensions"; each bit of information, whether about an event, 
object or person, is placed in one of the categories. In the case of
information about a person, the ultimate combination of elements in
other words, the resulting evaluation— -depends on how many ways the 
categories or dimensions are combined to produce a variety of aspects 
which the perceiver ascribes to the target person. This in turn is a 
function of the level of cognitive complexity possessed by the perceiver 
and environmental factors present while the information is being com­
bined. Persons with a high level of conceptual or cognitive complex­
ity not only have more dimensions available to them, but are also able
6to combine the dimensions in more ways than individuals with a low 
level of cognitive complexity, who, Schroder notes, should tend to 
view information in terms of black and white with few shades of grey 
in between.
Schroder has used this formulation to predict differential 
utilization of non-social information, employing tasks in which the 
complexity of the information as well as level of cognitive complexi­
ty is varied. In one representative study, Streufert et al(1965), 
using the Inter-Nation Simulation Game(INS) as a testing instrument, 
examined the influence of cognitive complexity on decision-making, 
with the amount of information successively increased over a number 
of trials. Results indicated that subjects high in cognitive complex- 
ity are able to use more information and are therefore likely to make 
more adequate decisions. Other studies have examined the effects of 
this variable on conflict resolution (Schroder and Crano, 1965), per­
ceptual processes(Schroder, Streufert and Allen, 1962) and compon­
ent assessment (Schroder, Harvey, Hunt and Koslin, 1965).
A second line of research on cognitive complexity has linked 
it to a number of variables dealing with the social interaction pro­
cess and to other personality variables. Bieri(1965), for example, 
has demonstrated that individuals high in cognitive complexity seem 
able to make more correct predictions about another’s behavior, when 
given the same amount of information about that person as individuals 
low in cognitive complexity. Individuals high in cognitive complexity 
have also displayed a greater ability to deal with inconsistent infor-
mation(Mayo and Crockett, 1964; Leventhal and Singer, 1964), and, 
in general, seem slightly less extraverted(Bieri, 1957) and less sus­
ceptible to social desirability influences(Bieri, 1965).
The implications of this body of theory and research dealing 
with cognitive complexity for the study of the evaluation process 
seem clear. Two relevant factors emerge which form the basis for two 
hypotheses. First, it has been found that persons with a high level 
of cognitive complexity are able to combine categories in more ways; 
in terms of person perception, this should mean that they should pro­
duce more complex evaluations than individuals low in cognitive com­
plexity. The latter, no matter how many traits are inferred or com­
bined, should still evaluate the target person in terms of a few di­
mensions, primarily a "good-bad" dimension.
The second conclusion which can be drawn is that environmental 
factors(particularly stress) may influence the kind of evaluation 
which an individual produces. Schroder(1965) notes two fundamental 
properties of the environment which may influence utilization of infor­
mation, environmental complexity and environmental stress or arousal 
level, and theorizes that as arousal level becomes too high, cog­
nitive activity becomes more concrete,i.e., complexity level is re­
duced. It is therefore hypothesized that individuals operating un­
der stress will produce less complex evaluations than individuals in 
a less threatening environment.
The term "stressful environment", unfortunately, . is a general 
term which fails to indicate that stress may be introduced in the ex-
8perimental environment by a variety of techniques which may have dif­
ferent implications for the subject's behavior. In the case of a sub­
ject asked to perform an experimental task, a stressful environment 
may be produced in two ways. It may emanate from the task itself(the 
demands of the task, for example), or it may be introduced without being di­
rectly linked to the performance of the task. An interesting ques­
tion is whether stress will have a differential effect on the complexity 
of the perceiver's evaluation, depending upon which of these two ways 
it is induced in the subject. To investigate this possibility, two 
stress conditions, task-relevant and task-irrelevant stress, were in­
cluded in the design.
Method
Subjects. 48 male college undergraduates, enrolled in an
introductory psychology course, served as subjects. Participation 
was voluntary, and all subjects were paid $3.20 for their time.
Stimulus Materials. To provide a task adequately reflecting 
differences in utilization of information in evaluating another per­
son, two videotapes were employed. Two accomplices, experienced in 
acting, were asked to produce different kinds of behavior while in in­
teraction with each other. One served as the "neutral" party in the 
conversation. The other was, in one segment, mildly friendly; in 
another, mildly hostile. About four hours of conversation were video­
taped, and two 5-minute segments, representing the two kinds of behavior,
9were eventually selected as experimental items. „ To insure that 
the segments were both realistic and displayed approximately equal a- 
mounts of friendliness and hostility, the segments were screened by 
10 independent judges who were not informed of the experiment's 
purpose. Five of the judges viewed the "friendly" tape; the remain­
ing five viewed the hostile tape. The semantic differential(Os­
good, Suci and Tannebaum, 1957) was employed to assess the judges' 
reaction to the target person. With 1 representing a very favorable judg­
ment and 7 a very unfavorable judgment, the average rating was 2.50 
for the "friendly" person and 5.2 for the "hostile" person; thus, the 
two kinds of behavior were equally polarized. A t-test, using 
deviations from the neutral point as scores, revealed no significant 
difference(t^ = .18, df = 8, NS) with respect to distance from neutrali­
ty.
Stress was manipulated by the use of electrical equipment, 
consisting of two control panels with a complex series of lights and 
dials mounted on a heavy frame. The words "Electric Shock Generator" 
were printed in large letters on one control panel, and electrodes 
were connected to the machine. To enhance the effectiveness of the 
equipment in inducing stress, electrode paste and an elastic band for 
securing the electrodes to the S>s were placed on the table in the ex­
perimental room next to the equipment. The ability of the equipment to 
induce stress was also pretested, using 6 j[s, again unconnected 
with the experiment in any other way. Half of these Ss were shown the
10
film segments and taken to the room containing the equipment; the 
others were taken to a similar room containing no equipment, _Ss in 
the former condition reported significantly more symptoms of stress on 
a questionnaire(_t = 4.74, df = 4,2. *01) thaii Ss in the latter
condition. Galvanic Skin Response(GSR) measures taken during this 
pretesting session confirmed the efficacy of the machine in inducing 
stress.
Procedure. All Ss were given a test of cognitive complexity 
(Bieri, 1955) several weeks prior to the experiment. A cognitive com­
plexity score was derived for each S>. and the set of scores split at 
the median. Ss scoring above the median comprised the high cognitive 
complexity (HC) group; Ss whose scores fell below the median were 
placed in the low cognitive complexity(LC) group. To minimize 
the effects of experimenter bias, Ss were then scheduled for experi­
mental sessions by an assistant who was uninformed about the true 
nature of the experiment. _E thus had no way of knowing the complexity 
level of the Ss during these sessions.
On entering the experimental room, each S^ was given a set of 
instructions to read before proceeding:
In recent years, psychologists have become increas­
ingly interested in how impressions of other people 
are formed and how evaluative judgments are made about 
them. Specifically, researchers have been concerned with 
the manner in which stable opinions are formed about an 
individual and persist even when that individual’s be­
havior is different in different situations.
In the first part of the experiment, you will see 
two pieces of film. Over the past semester, I have been 
bringing subjects into this room in pairs, telling them 
that my experiment dealt with impression formation, and 
asking them to talk with each other for awhile. Supposedly,,
11
they would then fill out rating scales of each other. 
In.reality, their conversation was videotaped from be­
hind a one way mirror. These two pieces of film are 
part of a conversation between two of these people. 
Please look at them carefully. Any questions?
Each then viewed the two film segments. For the entire 
group of S s ;the order of presentation was counterbalanced, so that 
half the S_s saw the "friendly" tape first and half viewed the "Hos­
tile" tape first. After seeing the tapes, the Ss were led to one of 
two randomly assigned rooms. Ss in the neutral or no-stress(NS) con­
dition were taken to a room containing no electrical equipment and 
merely asked to spend five minutes recording their evaluation of the 
target person after seeing "two different sides of his personality."
Ss in the two stress conditions were taken to the room containing the 
electrical equipment, and were given slightly different instruc­
tions, depending on the stress condition to which they had been 
assigned. j>s in the task-irrelevant stress condition(IS) were told 
that they had actually signed up for two experiments, and that after 
they had finished the evaluation, they would participate in another 
brief, unrelated experiment involving the use of the electrical equip­
ment. Ss in the task-relevant stress condition(RS) were told that 
there would be another part to the experiment after they finished their 
evaluations, involving the use of the equipment. They were also 
told that this second part would require them to employ the infor­
mation they had gained about the target person. Hence the implied 
threat of shock was in this condition directly linked to the informa­
tion.
12
After the _Ss had completed the evaluations, JE conducted 
interviews to ascertain the effectiveness of the manipulations. All 
of the Ss were apparently unaware of the deceptions involved, and on­
ly one voiced any suspicions about the E_'s veracity. Ss were then 
fully debriefed concerning the nature of the experiment, and the 
necessity of using the threat of shock as an experimental device was 
explained. E_ then answered any questions the Ss had until the Ss 
seemed satisfied with the explanations given. Each ^  was then paid 
$3.20 and sworn to secrecy about the experiment before leaving.
Results and Discussion
An analysis of the data was conducted for 42 of the original 
48 Ss. Three Ss were eliminated because they personally knew the 
target person, three J3s repeatedly failed to appear for their exper—  
mental sessions, and one was eliminated because of suspicion about 
the stress manipulation.
For each S^, two separate scores were tabulated; the number 
of constructs used (the dependent variable in the study) and the to­
tal number of words employed in writing the evaluation. Each set of 
scores was then separately analyzed in a 2(level of cognitive complex­
ity) x 3(stress) analysis of variance.
Table 1 lists the mean number of constructs used by S!s in 
each condition. The largest number of constructs was used by Ss 
high in cognitive complexity operating in a non-threatening environ-
TABLE 1
MEAN NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTS USED BY COMPLE­
XITY LEVEL AND STRESS CONDITION
NS RS IS
High complexity
Low Complexity
8.00 5.71 5.28
4.28 3.71 3.14
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TABLE 2
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR CONSTRUCT SCORES
Source of Variance df Mean Square F
Complexity 1 72.02 36.74*
Stress 2 14.02 7715*
Interaction 2 3.16 1.61
Within Groups 36 1.96
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ment; in general, Ss high in cognitive complexity used more constructs 
than Ss in the LC condition. Similarly, Ss in the neutral condition 
tended to use more constructs than Ss subjected to stress. An analysis 
of variance for these scores, given in Table 2, reveals both of these 
differences to be significant. j3s in the HC condition wrote signifi­
cantly (F = 36.74, d_f = 1/36, j) <• .001) more complex evaluations 
than Ss in the LC condition; j3s writing their evaluations in a non­
threatening environment wrote significantly (F = 7.15,df = 2 / 3 6 , . 0 0 1 )  
more complex evaluations than Ss subjected to stress. No significant 
interaction effects were observed.
In earlier studies cited, it was evident that utilization 
of information of a non-social nature is influenced by both personality 
and environmental variables. These results strongly support the hypo­
thesis that utilization of social information characteristics or
traits of a target person inferred from viewing that person in interac­
tion with others is affected in a similar fashion by both of these
influences.
Since interpersonal evaluation is itself a process of utiliza­
tion of available information, it is hardly surprising that differences 
in characteristic modes of information utilization produce different 
kinds of evaluations. Individuals high in cognitive complexity, 
who have available to them not only a larger number of dimensions, 
but also more schemata for organizing various sets of combinatory rules, 
were able to produce more complex evaluations than individuals with a 
low complexity index. It may be inferred that, subjectively, the latter
16
received less information about the target person, even though ob­
jectively the amount of information presented was equivalent for 
both groups. For example, Ss high in cognitive complexity, after 
viewing the "friendly" side of the target person, may have developed 
a number of dimensions as a basis for judgment, such as "fair-minded"; 
"friendly"; "good conversationalist." Ss low in cognitive complexity, 
on the other hand, might have placed all of this information in one 
dimension, "good." Thus, when asked to judge the person, the only 
evaluation that these Ss could make of him was that he seemed to be 
a "good" person.
Scott(1963) has contended that one's level of cognitive com­
plexity may be defined as the number of dimensions available to the 
individual independent of the basic "good-bad" dimension. An examina­
tion of the evaluations written by Ss in both complexity groups tends 
to support this notion, although no quantitative data has been gather­
ed. By and large, Ss in the low complexity group seemed less concerned 
with describing the target person in a number of ways than they were
with ascribing to him one major quality often either "good" or "bad”
 and defending that evaluation with examples of his behavior in the
film segments.
The mean number of words used by the Ss in writing their evalu­
ations is given in Table 3 for each condition. The means reveal no 
striking pattern, with each group of Ss averaging between 80 and 110 
words. An analysis of variance for these scores, presented in Table 4,
17
TABLE 3
MEAN NUMBER OF WORDS USED BY COMPLEXITY LEVEL AND TYPE OF STRESS
NS RS IS
r —  'i
High Complexity 87.0 102.0 83.57
Low Complexity 93.28 86.57 83.85
TABLE 4
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR NUMBER OF WORDS
Source of Variance df Mean Square F
Complexity 1 91.52 .09
Stress 2 397.23
CM
Interaction 2 440.09 .47
Within Groups 36 935.1
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shows no significant differences for either main effects or interactions.
Correlations between all three sets of scores (cognitive com­
plexity, number of constructs, number of words) are presented in Table 
5. The only significant correlation obtained is for cognitive com­
plexity score and number of constructs; these two sets of scores cor­
relate at the .01 level (r = .44, d£ = 40, £<^.01). The correlations 
between words and cognitive complexity and between words and constructs 
are negligible.
One problem with using the number of constructs as a measure 
of complexity of an evaluation is that it may be contaminated by the 
number of words the individual writes. Obviously, the more words a 
subject writes, the greater the probability that he will also use more 
constructs. Thus, differences in verbal fluency may obscure real dif­
ferences in cognitive functioning, leading to interpretative difficul­
ties. The data analysis for number of words used, however, indicates 
that at least in the present study, verbal fluency had no impact on num­
ber of constructs. Not only did an analysis of variance for words fail 
to reveal any significant differences in any combination of conditions, 
but, in addition, the correlation between number of words and number of 
constructs was only .003.
Figure 1 illustrates some of the relationships implied in the 
differences among the cell means for number of constructs. It is readi­
ly apparent that most of the differences in scores across stress levels 
were accounted for by the difference between the neutral condition 
and the two stress conditions. An orthogonal analysis of the cell means 
(Edwards, 1962) confirms this finding, with a significant(_t = 3.67, df 
= 42, p <.Q01) difference between the Ns condition and the RS and IS
20
TABLE 5
SUMMARY OF CORRELATIONS BETWEEN COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY 
SCORES, NUMBER OF WORDS AND NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTS
Complexity Complexity Words and
and Words and Constructs Constructs
*£ <  •01
FIGURE 1
MEAN NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTS USED IN EACH CONDI­
TION BY STRESS LEVEL AND COMPLEXITY SCORE
ME
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HIGH COMPLEXITY 
LOW COMPLEXITY
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conditions combined.
Despite the fact that no significant interaction effects were 
found in the analysis of variance for constructs, the influence of stress 
seemed to differ for the two complexity levels. In the HC condition, 
there was a proportionally greater decrease in the number of constructs 
from no-stress to stress conditions; the difference was much less strik­
ing in the LC condition. An analysis of simple effects(Winer, 1962) 
shown in Table 6, supported this interpretation. There was a signifi­
cant difference (F = 7.6, df^  = 2/36, jp .001) between the stress 
conditions for _Ss high in cognitive complexity, while the difference 
in the LC condition was minimal (F_ = 1.16, df = 2/36, NS). 86% of the 
total variance for the stress conditions and the interaction of stress 
and cognitive complexity was accounted for by the differences among 
stress levels in the HC condition.
An assessment of the effects of stress reveals primarily that 
environmental stress reduces the capacity of the evaluator to cope 
with information about the target person, and that the strength of its 
influence may depend on the individual’s normal level of cognitive 
functioning. The data clearly indicate a drop in the complexity of the 
individual’s evaluation when environmental conditions are altered 
from normal to stressful. Schroder (1965) notes that stress might 
act in two ways on cognitive mechanisms: it may reduce the number of 
dimensions readily available to the individual for use, or it may weak­
en cognitive links between the different dimensions. The present study 
does not offer concrete support for one or the other of these interpre-
23
TABLE 6
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR SIMPLE EFFECTS OF STRESS 
WITHIN EACH COMPLEXITY LEVEL
Source of Variance df Mean Square F
Stress for High Complexity 2 14.90 7.6*
Stress for Low Complexity 2 2.28 1.16
Within Groups 36 1.96
* £  <.001
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tations, but it does suggest that stress acts to reduce utilization 
of information already taken in rather than acting as any kind of "input 
filter." The fact that Ss were exposed to the threat of shock after 
viewing the videotapes eliminates the latter interpretation.
Moreover, stress seems to act in a similar manner regardless 
of whether or not it is directly linked to the information utilized 
in making the evaluation (i.e., whether or not it is perceived as 
relevant to the task). Within each complexity level, the reduction 
in the number of constructs used was identical for both task-relevant 
and task-irrelevant stress. Apparently, Ss do not make a distinction 
between shock which is going to be administered in another experiment 
and shock which is going to be administered as a part of the one they 
are engaged in; both are equally threatening. Perhaps making the 
shock contingent on how well the performs his task, and providing 
him with explicit criteria for performance, would have produced a larg­
er difference. An alternative procedure would entail making the 
stress not merely "relevant" to the task, but intrinsic to it. In 
this study, both kinds of stress were induced experimentally; for cer­
tain kinds of tasks, the stress is "built into" task performance.
Fear of failure is a primary example of such stress, and in such a case, 
it is possible that significant differences would in fact be found 
between an "intrinsic stress" condition and a "task-irrelevant" stress 
condition.
On the other hand, the inference can be made that stress does 
function differently for high and low complexity Ss, with Ss in the *
latter condition showing a smaller impairment in performance than 
Ss high in cognitive complexity. The simplest explanation for 
these results is that Ss high in cognitive complexity had "more 
to lose" than LC Ss. The latter are characterized throughout the 
literature as individuals possessing only a few informational 
dimensions. It is unlikely, therefore, that stress could have 
substantially reduced an already low level of cognitive function­
ing. In contrast, Ss high in cognitive complexity, with a large 
number of dimensions, show much larger reductions in ability to 
utilize information. Given this fact, further research might em­
ploy only high cognitive complexity _Ss and delineate more precisely 
the levels of stress and their influence on the evaluation process. 
It is quite possible, for example, that a slight amount of stress 
would not impair, or might even enhance evaluative performance.
26
REFERENCES
Abelson, R. Do predispositional factors summate? American Psycholo­
gist, 1961, 377-381.
Anderson, N.H. Averaging versus adding: stimulus combination rules 
in impression formation. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
1965, 70 394-400.
Bieri, J. Cognitive complexity-simplicity and predictive behavior. 
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1955, 51,263-268.
Bieri, J. Complexity-simplicity as a personality variable in cogni­
tive and preferential behavior. In D.W. Fiske and S.R. Maddi, 
(Eds.), Functions of varied experience, Homewood, 111.: Dor­
sey Press, 1961.
Bieri, J., Bradburn, W. and Galinsky, M. Sex differences in percep­
tual behavior. Journal of Personality, 1958, 26, 1-12*
Bruner, J.S. Going beyond the information given. In J. Bruner,
E. Brunswik, L. Festinger, F. Heider, K.F. Muenzinger, C.E. 
Osgood, and D. Rapaport(Eds.), Contemporary approaches to 
cognition. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1957, Pp. 41-69.
Gulliksen, H. Measurement of subjective values. Psychometrika, 1956, 
21, 229-244.
Harvey, O.J., Hunt, D. and Schroder, H. Conceptual systems and 
personality organization. New York: Wiley, 1961.
Heider, F. The psychology of interpersonal relations. New York: 
Wiley, 1958.
Jones, E. and Davis, K. From acts to dispositions: the attribution 
process in person perception. In L. Berkowitz(Ed.), Advances 
in experimental social psychology. New York: Academic Press, 
Vol. II.
Jones, E., Davis, K. and Gergen, K. Role playing variations and their 
informational value for person perception. Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology, 1961, _63, 302-310.
REFERENCES
Jones, E., Gergen, K. and Jones, R. Tactics of ingratiation among
leaders and subordinates in a status hierarchy. Psychological 
Monographs, 1963, 77.
Kelley, H.H. Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine 
(Ed.) Nebraska symposium on motivation, 1967, Vol. XV.
Leventhal, H. Cognitive processes and interpersonal predictions.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1957, 55., 176-180.
Levy, L.H. and Richter, M.L. Impression of groups as a function of 
the stimulus value of their individual members. Journal.of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960, 61, 21-24.
Mayo, C.W. and Crockett, W.H. Cognitive complexity and primacy-re- 
cency effects in impression formation. Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology, 1964, 6j3, 335-338.
Schroder,H. and Blackman, S. The measurement of conceptual dimensions. 
ONR Technical Report No. 16, Princeton University, 1965(Abstract)
Schroder, H. and Crano, W.D. Complexity of attitude structure and 
processes of conflict resolution. Unpublished manuscript, 
Princeton University, 1965 (Abstract).
Schroder, H., Driver, M. and Streufert, S. Human information process­
ing. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967.
Schroder, H., Harvey, 0., Hunt, D.E. and Koslin, B.E. Component assess 
ment in Peace Corps trainees, 1965 (Abstract).
Schroder, H., Streufert, S. and Allen, P.S. The effects of instruc­
tional variation and stress on the perception of aniseikonic 
distortion. Unpublished senior thesis, Princeton University,
1962(abstract).
Schroder, H. and Suedfield, P. (Eds.). Personality theory and infor­
mation processing. New York: Ronald Press, 1971.
Scott, W.A. Conceptualizing and measuring structural properties of 
cognition. In O.J. Harvey(Ed.), Motivation and social inter­
action: Cognitive determinants. New York: Ronald Press, 1963.
28
REFERENCES
Streufert, S., Clardy, M., Driver,M., Karlins, M., Schroder, H.M. 
and Suedfield, P. A tactical game for the analysis of com­
plex decision making in individuals and groups. Psychological 
Reports, 1965, 3J, 723-729.
Weiss, W. Scale judgments of triplets of opinion statements. Journal 
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1963, 66, 471-479.
VITA
Kevin Thomas Kelso
Born in Chicago, Illinois, July 9, 1950. Graduated from 
Culver Military Academy, Culver, Indiana, June, 1967. A.B., Col­
lege of the Holy Cross (Worcester, Mass.), June, 1971. M.A. can­
didate, College of William and Mary, 1971-73, with a concentration 
in psychology.
In September, 1971, the author entered the College of William 
and Mary as a graduate assistant in the Department of Psychology.
e i b r a r y
